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Visual working memoryThe fundamental goal of perception is to aid in the achievement of behavioral objectives. This requires
extracting and communicating useful information from noisy and uncertain sensory signals. At the same
time, given the complexity of sensory information and the limitations of biological information process-
ing, it is necessary that some information must be lost or discarded in the act of perception. Under these
circumstances, what constitutes an ‘optimal’ perceptual system? This paper describes the mathematical
framework of rate–distortion theory as the optimal solution to the problem of minimizing the costs of
perceptual error subject to strong constraints on the ability to communicate or transmit information.
Rate–distortion theory offers a general and principled theoretical framework for developing
computational-level models of human perception (Marr, 1982). Models developed in this framework
are capable of producing quantitatively precise explanations for human perceptual performance, while
yielding new insights regarding the nature and goals of perception. This paper demonstrates the applica-
tion of rate–distortion theory to two benchmark domains where capacity limits are especially salient in
human perception: discrete categorization of stimuli (also known as absolute identification) and visual
working memory. A software package written for the R statistical programming language is described
that aids in the development of models based on rate–distortion theory.
 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Perception is the act of extracting meaning from noisy and
uncertain sensory signals, and in the process choosing what infor-
mation to transmit and what to discard. Once perceived, percep-
tual memory is the act of sending a message to your future self.
The fundamentally communicative nature of perception and mem-
ory suggests the relevance of information theory to the study of per-
ceptual processing. However, for biological information processing
systems, it is not enough to merely transmit information. Rather,
the goal of perceptual processing must be to help the organism
achieve goals. This suggests a utilitarian perspective on human
perception. Rate–distortion theory (Berger, 1971; Shannon, 1959)
represents the mathematical framework combining these two dis-
ciplines: information theory and decision theory.
This paper focuses on rate–distortion theory as a principled
mathematical framework for understanding human perception
and perceptual memory. The goal is to explain perception as a form
of computational rationality (Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenenbaum,
2015)—the maximization of performance subject to constraints
on information processing. When sensory signals are continuous
rather than discrete, or when communication channels lack suffi-cient capacity, the loss of some information is inevitable. In this
case, the goal of perception cannot be the perfect transmission,
storage, or reproduction of afferent signals, but rather the mini-
mization of some cost function subject to constraints on available
capacity. Rate–distortion theory concerns the optimal solution to
this difficult tradeoff.
With its focus on minimizing the costs of error, as well as opti-
mally integrating prior beliefs and uncertain sensory evidence,
rate–distortion theory shares much in common with the proba-
bilistic inference approach to perception (Kersten, Mamassian, &
Yuille, 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996) and in particular Bayesian
decision theory (Körding, 2007; Maloney & Mamassian, 2009).
Hence, rate–distortion theory has much to say about how biologi-
cal organisms should behave in a particular environment, in keep-
ing with ideal observer (Geisler, 2011) or rational analysis
(Anderson, 1990) approaches to understanding human cognition.
Such models can serve as a benchmark for comparing against
human performance, or may inspire theories of the underlying
neural mechanisms. Importantly, unlike fully rational Bayesian
models of perception, rate–distortion theory offers a means of
directly incorporating strong limits on the capabilities of the cogni-
tive system (in terms of channel capacity limits) in a principled and
theory-driven manner. In this regard, rate–distortion theory
represents an important tool for those interested in studying the
computational rationality of cognition.
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sion of much existing work in sensory neuroscience to higher-
level perception. The efficient coding hypothesis (Barlow, 1961)
suggests that the goal for neural information processing is to form
efficient codes for sensory signals. In this context, ‘efficient’ refers
to the reduction of redundancy. This idea has proven extremely
useful for understanding the properties of early cortical processing
of visual information, such as the nature of receptive fields in V1
(Olshausen & Field, 1997). However, reducing redundancy is but
one possible goal for biological computation. For organisms acting
in an environment, it may be more important for perceptual sys-
tems to be ‘‘good” than ‘‘efficient”. Here a good perceptual system
is one that accurately and reliably solves important perceptual
problems. The distinction is that costs and constraints can be
imposed not just by the internal neural architecture, but also by
the goals of the organism and the structure of the external environ-
ment. Rate–distortion theory generalizes the idea of efficient cod-
ing to allow for a broader range of possible cost functions (Hino &
Murata, 2009; Simoncelli & Olshausen, 2001).
The following section briefly introduces information theory and
its core constructs. These constructs are then used to motivate the
fundamental problem addressed by rate–distortion theory. The
theory is then applied to two domains: absolute identification
(the assignment of perceptual stimuli to ordinal categories) and
perceptual working memory. In each case, rate–distortion theory
contributes something fundamentally new to the understanding
of human perception.1 In Eq. (1) and throughout this paper, define 0 log 0 ¼ 0.2. Information theory: a brief introduction
Information theory is a scientific field spanning the boundaries
of mathematics and engineering. It was first codified by Claude
Shannon in 1948 under the title ‘‘A Mathematical Theory of Com-
munication”, and the following year with an introductory essay by
Warren Weaver, as ‘‘The Mathematical Theory of Communication”
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949). The subtle change in definite article
reflected the growing realization of the definitiveness of the the-
ory—a Bell Labs engineer who followed the developments noted
that Shannon’s publication ‘‘came as a bomb, and something of a
delayed action bomb” (Gleick, 2011, p. 221). In the decades that
followed, information theory had a transformative effect on many
fields, psychology and neuroscience included. Concise reviews of
the history of information theory in psychology and neuroscience
are given in Luce (2003) and Dimitrov, Lazar, and Victor (2011).
More extensive introductions to information theory can be found
in Gallistel and King (2009, chap. 1) and Cover and Thomas (2012).
Perhaps the most famous application of information theory
within psychology is George Miller’s ‘‘The Magical Number Seven,
Plus or Minus Two” (Miller, 1956). This paper concerned two quite
different topics: what Miller termed the span of immediate mem-
ory, and the span of absolute judgment. The former topic intro-
duced the concept of a chunk to the lexicon of cognitive
psychology. The latter proposed a limit on the number of bits avail-
able for the categorical identification of a perceptual signal. This
latter topic offers the most direct approach to information theory.
Quite simply, a bit is a unit of measure for a quantity of infor-
mation. It is important to emphasize that a unit of measure is
not the same as the physical quantity that is being measured. For
example, in the 19th century the meter was defined as the distance
between two marks on a platinum bar. Clearly, objects can be mea-
sured in meters even if they are not constructed out of platinum.
The distinction is important, because a bit is commonly understood
to refer to a binary digit—a 1 or a 0—but this connection is often
misleading. A binary digit conveys one bit of information, but infor-
mation need not be transmitted via a binary code. A photoreceptorin the retina conveys information in the form of an analog and
graded signal. Despite this, the signal conveyed by a photoreceptor
is meaningfully measured and studied in terms of its information-
theoretic content, measured in bits.
If a bit measures information, then what is information?
Answering this question requires that a few elementary concepts
first be introduced. The first such concept is that of a random vari-
able, labeled x. Informally, a random variable is something that can
take one of a set of different possible values, where each value has
an associated probability. For example, xmight refer to the roll of a
6-sided die, in which case the value of the random variable is
defined by the set f1;2; . . . ;6g, and if the die is fair, the associated
probabilities Pðx ¼ xiÞ ¼ 16 for xi 2 f1 . . .6g. In information theory,
the set of possible values that a random variable can take is also
called its alphabet. Random variables can be defined over continu-
ous alphabets as well. The height of a person is a random variable
whose domain is (in principle) all possible positive values. In this
case, the probability density function pðxÞ, describing the distribu-
tion of heights, might resemble a Gaussian or normal distribution.
For a discrete random variable taking a particular value x ¼ xi, it
is possible to define the surprise of that event as  log pðx ¼ xiÞ.
Why should the logarithm be relevant for measuring surprise? If
pðx ¼ xiÞ ¼ 0 then  log 0 ¼ 1. In other words, impossible events
are infinitely surprising. On the other hand, if pðx ¼ xiÞ ¼ 1 then
 log 1 ¼ 0: outcomes that are certain to happen are not surprising
at all. Another justification for a logarithmic measure of surprise
relates to the additivity of information gained by independent out-
comes. For example, if x and y are independent random variables,
then the ‘total surprise’ of observing both should (intuitively) equal
the sum of the surprise of each outcome individually. Using a log-
arithmic definition,  log pðx ^ yÞ ¼ ð log pðxÞÞ þ ð log pðyÞÞ.
Thus, the negative logarithm of probability provides an intuitively
correct measure of the surprisingness of an event. With surprise
formalized in this manner, the entropy of a random variable is sim-
ply its ‘average surprise’1:
HðxÞ ¼ 
X
i
PðxiÞ log PðxiÞ: ð1Þ
Note that this equation is simply the surprise of each outcome,
weighted by its probability of occurrence. If a random variable has
two equiprobable outcomes, the entropy of this binary random
variable equals 1 when the logarithm is taken as base 2. This is
defined to be 1 bit of information. Hence, the outcome of a fair coin
flip conveys a single bit of information. When the natural loga-
rithm is used, the corresponding unit of information is the nat
(1 nat  1.44 bits).
Entropy describes the amount of information intrinsic to, or
‘contained’ in a random variable. Now consider a communication
channel for conveying information from this source, as illustrated
in Fig. 1. The input to this channel consists of samples from the
random variable x. The output is also a random variable, labeled
y. A communication channel relates a given input to the channel
output via a conditional probability distribution, Pðy jxÞ.
To give a concrete illustration of how the human perceptual
system can be viewed as a communication channel as in Fig. 1,
consider the task of visually judging (perceiving) the size of an
object sitting on a table. The true size can be labeled x, and charac-
terized by a probability distribution pðxÞ. The different possible val-
ues for x define the alphabet for the channel (if x is continuous,
then the source alphabet is also infinite). The distribution pðxÞ
might reflect, for example, the fact that it would be unlikely to
encounter extremely large objects sitting on a typical-sized table.
Due to intrinsic noise in neural coding, it is physically impossible
Fig. 1. The core constructs of rate–distortion theory. An information source is
described by a probability distribution over its alphabet. Samples from this source
are communicated over a noisy or capacity-limited channel, resulting in a
conditional probability distribution over the channel output. A cost function
defines the consequences of error in communication.
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resentation is necessarily noisy and error-prone. Consequently, in
decoding this neural representation to arrive at a ‘‘best guess”, this
guess y (the output of the channel) would also be error-prone.
Hence, the channel itself can be described by a conditional proba-
bility distribution pðy jxÞ. Note that in the general case the alphabet
for the channel input and output need not be the same. For exam-
ple, the channel input might consist of a continuous signal, and the
channel output a discrete category label or a binary response.
How do we measure the amount of information conveyed by
such a channel? Intuitively, conveyed information can be no
greater than the information contained in the source. But if the
channel is noisy or error prone, the conveyed information of the
output signal may be less than the entropy of the source. Thus,
both the information source and the properties of the channel
are relevant for measuring the communication of information.
Mathematically, these two aspects are related by the mutual infor-
mation of the channel input and output:
Iðx; yÞ ¼ HðxÞ  Hðx jyÞ ¼
X
i
X
j
Pðyj jxiÞPðxiÞ log
Pðyj jxiÞ
PðyjÞ
; ð2Þ
where Hðx jyÞ refers to the conditional entropy,
Hðx jyÞ ¼
X
j
PðyjÞHðx jy ¼ yjÞ
¼ 
X
j
PðyjÞ
X
i
Pðxi jyjÞ log Pðxi jyjÞ: ð3Þ
As shown by the top line of Eq. (2), mutual information mea-
sures the reduction in entropy regarding the channel input, after
observing the output of the channel. A channel that conveys a lot
of information greatly reduces uncertainty regarding the input sig-
nal. When the channel input or output are defined by continuous
signals, the summations above can be replaced by integrals. Like
entropy, mutual information is also measured in units of bits (or
nats). Mutual information defines the information rate of a given
channel and information source. Here, rate does not intrinsically
refer to time (bits per second), but rather the average number of
bits communicated by the channel per symbol from the source
alphabet (bits per symbol). For example, consider a sequence of
outcomes generated from repeatedly rolling a 6-sided die. If these
outcomes are communicated over a channel, the information rate
of the channel—defined by the mutual information—is the number
of bits conveyed per die roll (the reduction in uncertainty), aver-
aged across the sequence of outcomes.
Mutual information depends on the properties of the informa-
tion source, PðxÞ as well as the behavior of the channel, Pðy jxÞ. Ifone were to take a fixed channel defined by Pðy jxÞ, and use it to
communicate signals from different source distributions, one
would find that the mutual information would be higher for some
information sources, and lower for others. The capacity of a chan-
nel is given by the maximum of the mutual information, over the
space of all possible information sources pðxÞ.3. Rate–distortion theory: information theory meets decision
theory
It is deceptively easy to define a perfect communication chan-
nel. This is simply a channel where the output always equals the
input. For example, in a perfect visual memory system, one would
simply remember the world as it appears. However, in practical
settings perfect performance is rarely achievable. Indeed, it is a
somewhat counterintuitive fact that a perfect communication
channel cannot exist when the information source is continuous.
Even when signals are discrete rather than continuous, perfect
communication might not be possible or feasible. The capacity of
the channel might be lower than the entropy of the information
source, the output alphabet of the channel might have fewer sym-
bols than the input alphabet, or the channel might have known
mechanistic limitations that limit its fidelity. In any of these cases,
the goal of error-free communication must simply be abandoned.
In its place, the goal in such a setting must be to minimize the
costs of communication error. To this end, it is necessary to define
a cost function, Lðx; yÞ. This function specifies the cost associated
with the event of an input signal x being conveyed as the value
y. An intuitive cost function might be the squared error between
the channel input and output: Lðx; yÞ ¼ ðy xÞ2. Channels where
the output closely resembles the input will have low cost according
to this measure. The distortion, or average cost associated with a
particular information source and channel is given by
D ¼ E½Lðx; yÞ ¼
X
i
X
j
Lðxi; yjÞPðyj jxiÞPðxiÞ ð4Þ
If a particular cost function and information source are speci-
fied, then an optimal communication channel is one that mini-
mizes distortion. Generally speaking, channels with higher
capacity will be able to do a better job of minimizing costs than
channels with lower capacity. But since any physical channel,
labeled Q, must have a finite capacity, the problem becomes one
of optimization under constraints. This is the fundamental problem
addressed by rate–distortion theory (Berger, 1971; Shannon,
1959). We can state this problem more formally as follows:
QH ¼ argmin
Q
DðQÞ ð5Þ
subject to IðQÞðx; yÞ 6 C:
The equation states that an optimal information channel
(labeled QH) for a given information source is one that minimizes
the channel distortion, subject to the constraint that the mutual
information of the source and channel is at or below a given bound
(indicated by C). The operator ‘arg min’ indicates the minimizing
argument of the expression—the channel that achieves the lowest
distortion. The distortion DðQÞ and mutual information IðQÞ are
determined according to a given channel Q ¼ Pðy jxÞ, and the
optimization is performed over the space of all possible channels
(i.e., over all valid conditional probability distributions).
Shannon’s noisy-channel coding theorem (Shannon & Weaver,
1949) states that when a channel has capacity greater than the
information rate of the source (the average number of bits commu-
nicated per transmission), it is possible to achieve an arbitrarily
small error rate. Most digital communication is concerned with
this case of error-free performance. Conversely however, when
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rence of error is unavoidable. In this case, the goal is not to avoid
error, but rather minimize the expected cost of error. Eq. (5) seeks
this lowest-possible cost.
The fundamental tradeoff described by rate–distortion theory is
that decreasing distortion (average cost) requires a corresponding
increase in the amount of information communicated by the chan-
nel. This tradeoff is captured by a rate–distortion curve, which
indicates the minimum channel capacity necessary to achieve a
particular level of performance. The important construct of a
rate–distortion curve is illustrated next using a simple example.
3.1. Example rate–distortion problem: rolling a six-sided die
In this example, a simple but concrete demonstration is pro-
vided of the application of rate–distortion theory. The goal is to
illustrate the mathematical concepts within a particularly simple
example in order to facilitate the understanding of this same
approach as applied to human perception. To illustrate the con-
struct of a rate–distortion curve, consider again the example of
rolling a six-sided die. The information source PðxiÞ ¼ 1=6 for
xi 2 f1 . . .6g. The task is to communicate the outcome of a roll
via a capacity-limited channel, and the cost function for this exam-
ple assumes that the goal is to maximize accuracy, or equivalently,
minimize the probability of error. That is,
Lðx; yÞ ¼ 0 x ¼ y
1 x – y

: ð6Þ
The goal is to find an optimal channel that minimizes expected
cost according to this measure. The optimal rate–distortion curve
for this example is illustrated in Fig. 2. This curve is expressed ana-
lytically as
RðDÞ ¼ log 6ð1 DÞð Þ þ D log D
5ð1 DÞ
 
: ð7Þ
Appendix A gives a complete derivation for this result. In brief,
this solution is obtained by formulating the objective in Eq. (5) as
an optimization problem, taking its derivative and analytically
solving for the optimal information channel that achieves the min-
imum. The appendix also describes several other methods for solv-
ing rate–distortion problems, including both analytic and efficient
numerical solution methods.0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
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Fig. 2. Rate–distortion curve for communicating the outcome of rolling a 6-sided
die, with a probability of error cost function.There are several noteworthy features of the rate–distortion
curve in Fig. 2. First, the curve reaches zero at the point D ¼ 5=6
along the x-axis. This indicates the expected probability of error
when no information is transmitted over the channel. Intuition
confirms that this value is correct: By simply guessing the result
of the die roll, one has a 1=6 chance of guessing correctly, and an
expected error rate of 5=6. The curve intercepts the y-axis at an
information rate of just over 2.5 bits. This is the minimum channel
capacity in order to achieve zero communication error. This value
also corresponds to the entropy of the source, HðxÞ  2:58 bits. In
between these two extremes, the curve shows that when some
amount of error is tolerable, there is an absolute minimum channel
capacity necessary to achieve the desired level of performance. Or
in other words, no physical communication channel can exist at a
point below this curve. Efficient communication channels are those
that exist at points along, or close to, the theoretical bound pre-
dicted by a rate–distortion curve. If human perception or memory
are efficient, one would predict their performance to lie close to a
rate–distortion curve.
Note that the curve shown in Fig. 2 is specific to both the infor-
mation source and the particular choice of cost function. Changing
either of these elements would result in a different optimal chan-
nel and a different rate–distortion tradeoff. The cost function
described by Eq. (6) is framed around minimizing the probability
of communication error. However, it is easy to imagine that some
types of errors may be more costly than others. In some gambling
games the stakes depend on whether the roll of a die indicates an
odd or even number. In such a scenario, Lð3;4Þ might be greater
than Lð3;5Þ, since in the former case an odd number is mistakenly
reported as even. For every cost function there exists an
information channel that is optimally efficient according to that
measure.3.2. Summary
Rate–distortion theory is concerned with finding optimal but
capacity-limited communication channels. The approach defines
a boundedly rational solution to the problem of information trans-
mission. Rather than attempting to perfectly convey signals, the
objective is to minimize the cost of error. This perspective very nat-
urally addresses a wide range of biological information processing
problems, as will be discussed below.
As a theoretical tool, a rate–distortion curve is highly useful. If
one wishes to study the properties of a particular channel—be it
a fiber optic cable or humanmemory—it is often difficult to directly
compute the channel capacity, as this requires complete and accu-
rate knowledge of the channel distribution Pðy jxÞ. However, mea-
suring performance or accuracy is often much easier. Having a
rate–distortion curve allows one to directly map between these
two quantities and infer a lower bound on channel capacity. Mea-
suring a given level of performance enables a strong statement of
the minimum capacity that the channel must possess. Further, this
prediction is entirely independent of model parameters or
assumptions.
The following two sections demonstrate the application of rate–
distortion theory to two topics in human perception: discrete cat-
egorization of perceptual stimuli (absolute identification) and
visual working memory. In each case the goal is an accessible
introduction to the concepts and information-theoretic methods
rather than a sophisticated and highly detailed model. For the
moment, it is assumed that the optimization problem described
by Eq. (5) can be solved to find an optimal channel QI ¼ Pðy jxÞ
for a given information source and cost function. Efficient numer-
ical and computational techniques for actually solving this prob-
lem are discussed in Appendix A.
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Absolute identification involves the mapping of perceptual
stimuli to ordinal categories. In a typical absolute identification
experiment, a participant is trained to discriminate between a set
of perceptual stimuli, such as a set of 10 different lines of varying
length, or tones of varying frequency or loudness. Each stimulus
item has an associated correct response, usually mapped to a dif-
ferent key on a keyboard. An absolute identification experiment
consists of repeatedly presenting the subject with a randomly cho-
sen stimulus, and asking the subject to respond with his or her best
guess regarding the ordinal identity of the stimulus.
Rouder, Morey, Cowan, and Pealtz (2004) conducted an experi-
ment examining absolute identification of line length.2 On each
trial, the subject was shown a line segment (displayed on a computer
monitor) and was required to press a corresponding key on the key-
board. The line segment shown on each trial was randomly sampled
from a set of different lengths. If shown the smallest line segment in
the set, the correct response was to press ‘1’. If shown the second
smallest, the correct response was ‘2’, etc. Feedback was given to
the participant after each response, indicating the correct response
for that stimulus.
Across three conditions of the experiment the number of lines
in the stimulus set was varied, using 13, 20, or 30 stimuli, and line
lengths were spaced according to a power function with exponent
3.5. Two participants completed all three conditions, and a third
participant completed just the 30-stimuli condition. Fig. 3a illus-
trates the most basic results from this experiment, plotting propor-
tion of correct responses for each of the stimuli in each condition.
The two most obvious features of the data are that performance
decreases as the number of stimuli in the set is increased, and that
performance is worse for stimuli in the middle of the range (ter-
med the ‘bow effect’).
Absolute identification was a central component of George Mill-
er’s famous ‘‘magical number seven” paper (Miller, 1956). The rea-
son is that performance in this type of experiment is intriguingly
but systematically poor. When trained on a stimulus set of about
seven items, participants can reach close to perfect performance.
But as the number of stimuli in the set increases, identification
accuracy decreases. Performance remains low even when neigh-
boring stimuli are highly discriminable (termed the ‘range effect’).
How can information theory be applied to explain these data?
For an experiment with a small discrete set of stimuli and
responses, the distribution Pðy jxÞ can be approximated via empir-
ical frequencies.3 This enables directly estimating the entropy of the
information source, HðxÞ and the mutual information of the ‘human
channel’, Iðx; yÞ. These values are plotted in Fig. 3b, where each line
indicates the data from one of the subjects. The dashed line in
Fig. 3b indicates perfect performance in the absence of a limit on
channel capacity. By contrast, transmitted information appears to
reach an asymptote.4 To Miller (1956) and others (Garner & Hake,
1951), this suggested that the fundamental limit in absolute identi-
fication was the channel capacity of the observer in processing per-
ceptual information; as Miller termed it, the ‘span of absolute
judgment’. Note however that this assessment is not without chal-
lenge. The data illustrated in Fig. 3 are obtained by collapsing across
many blocks of the experiment; Rouder et al. (2004) demonstrated2 At the time of writing, the complete data set for this experiment is available from
the website of Jeff Rouder, http://pcl.missouri.edu/.
3 Note however, that using empirical frequencies with small datasets may
significantly bias the calculation of mutual information. More sophisticated tech-
niques for computing mutual information from empirical data have been developed
(MacRae, 1970).
4 Diagnosing an asymptote in performance is questionable with three data points,
however the pattern reported here is consistent with a much larger body of evidence
(Miller, 1956).that performance improved substantially with training (see also
Dodds, Donkin, Brown, & Heathcote, 2011); thus it remains unclear
the extent to which channel capacity is invariably fixed. MacRae
(1970) argued that biases in the calculation of mutual information
using small datasests may give the illusion of a constant channel
capacity. When correcting for possible bias, mutual information
may peak, and then decline with increased source entropy, suggest-
ing that channel capacity is ‘‘limited, but not fixed” (MacRae, 1970).
If absolute identification is subject to a limit on channel capac-
ity in any form, then rate–distortion theory suggests that the goal
for perception should not be perfect identification, but rather the
minimization of error according to some cost function. This consti-
tutes a ‘boundedly rational’ view of perceptual categorization. But
what is the cost that should be minimized? Despite the long his-
tory of absolute identification in psychology, this question has
not previously been addressed. An obvious choice, matching the
instructions given to participants in the typical absolute identifica-
tion experiment, is to maximize the percent of trials answered cor-
rectly. This implies a cost function identical to that given in Eq. (6).
Note that this cost function is discrete and discontinuous: the mag-
nitude of the cost does not increase gradually with the magnitude
of the error.
It is also worth noting that this cost function can be stated
directly without introducing any free parameters into the model,
under the assumption that participants in the experiment ration-
ally seek to maximize their performance on the task. The predicted
behavior according to this model can be compared against
observed performance, and hence the hypothesis of computational
rationality is fully falsifiable.
Fig. 4 illustrates the resulting optimal rate–distortion curves
using this cost function and an information source with N = 13,
20, or 30 equally-likely values. Appendix B describes a software
package implemented in the R programming language that was
used to compute this curve. Overlaid on the plot are marker points
corresponding to the empirical performance from each subject.
Empirical information rate and distortion were estimated via Eqs.
(2) and (4), respectively, with the cost function defined by Eq.
(6). This figure illustrates that human performance is not only lim-
ited in capacity, but also rather inefficient at absolute identification,
at least according to the explicit instructions given to participants.
Inefficiency is defined in the following sense: without increasing
channel capacity, it would have been possible for participants to
substantially reduce their error rate. Graphically, this is indicated
by the fact that the plot markers in the graph could be translated
to the left without crossing the rate–distortion curve. A more for-
mal index of efficiency, , can be defined as follows:
 ¼ Demp  Dmax
DH  Dmax
; ð8Þ
where Demp reflects the empirical distortion according to a given
cost function, Dmax is the maximum distortion (the point where
the rate–distortion curve intercepts the x-axis, or equivalently the
optimal ‘guessing’ performance), and DH is the minimal distortion
for a channel with the same information rate as empirical perfor-
mance. Mean efficiency was  ¼ 0.94, 0.88, 0.69 for the three set
size conditions. Thus, human efficiency at absolute identification
appears to decrease as the number of stimuli to be discriminated
increases. Notably, this finding is undetectable in the absence of
rate–distortion theory.
Given this result, there are two obvious questions: How, and
why is human absolute identification inefficient?
To answer these questions it is useful to compare three different
models of absolute identification (Fig. 5a–c). Each model assumes
an information capacity limit constrained by observed human per-
formance, determined by computing the mutual information from
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) Results from an experiment on absolute identification of line length conducted by Rouder et al. (2004). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, computed
using a binomial test. (b) Human performance analyzed in terms of transmitted information (y-axis) as a function of the entropy of the information source (x-axis). Mutual
information was computed according to Eq. (2) by approximating conditional response distributions with empirical response frequencies. The dashed line indicates perfect
performance of a channel with no capacity limit.
Fig. 4. Optimal rate–distortion curves for an absolute identification experiment with N = 13, 20, or 30 equiprobable stimuli (left, middle, and right panels), and a maximum
accuracy cost function. Marker points indicate empirical performance for each subject. Information-theoretic efficiency, , is reported next to each point.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. Comparison of three information-theoretic models of absolute identification. Each panel plots the proportion correct according to the model (solid lines) and empirical
performance from the Rouder et al. dataset (plot markers). The models differ only in the cost function that is minimized. (a) Probability of error cost function. (b) Absolute
error cost function. (c) Empirically-derived cost function.
186 C.R. Sims / Cognition 152 (2016) 181–198the empirical response distributions. For simplicity, the models are
based on the aggregated data from each condition of the experi-
ment rather than fitting models separately to each subject. This
results in capacity limits of 3.01, 3.25, and 3.19 bits for the
N = 13, 20, and 30 conditions, respectively. Each of the three mod-
els is an optimal information channel according to Eq. (5), each has
the same limit on information transmission, and the models differ
only in the cost function that is minimized. The predictions of the
models follow directly from the optimal channel distributions QH.Model L1 uses the probability of error cost function, as in Eq.
(6). This cost function also matches the presumed task given to
subjects: Maximize the percent of trials answered correctly. Hence,
model L1 represents a normative model of human perceptual per-
formance. Given a constraint on capacity, the model performs in a
mathematically optimal fashion.
The performance of this model is illustrated in Fig. 5a. Although
this model transmits the same amount of information as
human participants, it substantially exceeds human performance.
C.R. Sims / Cognition 152 (2016) 181–198 187In addition, the model fails to exhibit the bow effect that is
characteristic of human performance. The reason for this difference
lies in the type of errors that human subjects and the model
commit. When subjects responded incorrectly in the experiment,
their errors were not random but rather tended to be close to the
correct value. By contrast, model L1 has no conception of ‘close’:
a response that is off by 5 stimulus levels is no worse than a
response that is off by 1. As a result, the error distribution for
model L1 is flat across all response categories. Near-misses convey
some amount of information about the correct stimulus, but do not
contribute to maximizing percent correct. This discrepancy also
explains why human performance was inefficient according to
the objective definition of the task.
The results from model L1 suggest that participants’ implicit
goals in the experiment were not to answer each trial correctly,
but rather to select a response category that is as close as possible
to the correct response. This distinction is subtle but important.
The latter objective implies a metric representation of stimuli
and responses. Model L2 (Fig. 5b) embodies this by using the cost
function L2 ¼ jy xj, where y and x are the ordinal response and
stimulus categories, respectively. Hence, according to model L2,
the best outcome is to generate the correct response, as this would
achieve zero cost. Failing that, the cost function suggests producing
a response that is as close as possible, where distance is linear in
the ordinal range of responses. Fig. 5b shows that this model exhi-
bits hints of the bow effect (higher performance for stimuli at the
extremes of the stimulus range). Accuracy for the model is also
lower than model L1, and closer to human performance, even
though both models convey the same amount of information.
However, model L2 still fails to capture empirical performance at
a detailed quantitative level. Model L2 used a cost function defined
over the ordinal stimulus and response categories, but similar pre-
dictions are obtained if the stimulus values (the actual line lengths)
are used instead.
In changing the cost function between model L1 and L2, the
theoretical status of the model has also changed in a subtle, but
important manner. The first model represents a quantitative, for-
mal, and falsifiable prediction for human performance. Indeed,
based on the quantitative inaccuracy of this model, one can confi-
dently reject it as a sufficient explanation for human perceptual
categorization. Importantly, model L2 is equally falsifiable, in the
sense that it also makes quantitative predictions that can be com-
pared against actual data. However, its status as a normative model
is now less clear-cut. There is no reason to believe that participants
should seek to minimize the absolute error in perceptual catego-
rization. The goal is to instead assess the descriptive adequacy of
a particular hypothesized cost function, rather than ascribe to it
normative status.
Model L3 also assumes a metric representation of the stimulus
and response space. But unlike L2, it is not assumed that this space
is linear with respect to either ordinal rank or physical line length.
In particular, it may be the case that Lð1;2Þ is higher or lower than
Lð4;5Þ. To allow for this possibility, model L3 assumes that each
ordinal stimulus or response category has an associated ‘anchor’
in psychological space. An anchor is essentially the mental repre-
sentation of a particular stimulus. The resulting cost of an error
is the distance between two anchors in this space, or
L3 ¼ jaðyÞ  aðxÞj, where aðjÞ is the location of the anchor corre-
sponding to ordinal stimulus or response category j. The assump-
tion that physical stimuli exist in a psychological metric space is
in fact common to many models of absolute identification (reviews
of several different modeling approaches are given in Shiffrin &
Nosofsky, 1994; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005).
The assumption of this model is that both perceptual stimuli
and ordinal responses are mapped into a common metric space.This formulation constrains the cost function to be symmetric such
that L3ðx; yÞ ¼ L3ðy; xÞ, but this is not a necessity of the mathemat-
ical framework. While models L1 and L2 have no free parameters,
in L3 the locations of the anchors are estimated from the empirical
data via maximum likelihood estimation (Myung, 2003). The like-
lihood function for the model is given directly by the conditional
distribution QI ¼ Pðy jxÞ. The anchors for the smallest and largest
stimuli were constrained to lie at 0 and 1, respectively. This results
in N  2 free parameters in the model, where N is the number of
stimuli in the training set (N = 13, 20, or 30).
The relatively large number of parameters in this models war-
rants brief discussion. Models L2 and L3 represent a progressive
shift away from normative models of performance, and towards
descriptive accounts of how the perceptual system actually per-
forms. By fitting the cost function to human performance, one
can understand performance in terms of the implicit cost func-
tion that it seeks to minimize. This approach is also known as
inverse decision theory (Körding, Fukunaga, Howard, Ingram, &
Wolpert, 2004), where the goal is to infer or estimate a utility
function starting from the observation of behavioral preferences.
As the number of free parameters in a model increases, the falsi-
fiability of the model decreases assuming that parameters are fit
to data, rather than specified in advance as a specific point
hypothesis. A completely descriptive account of the perceptual
cost function could be obtained by estimating Lðx; yÞ separately
for each possible ðx; yÞ combination. Importantly however, this
does not negate the utility of a descriptive model of human per-
ceptual processing.
The fit of this model is illustrated in Fig. 5c. The model accu-
rately captures both the average proportion correct, as well as
the distribution of errors (not shown). The estimated anchor posi-
tions for each of the ordinal stimuli are shown in Fig. 6a. The spac-
ing between anchors is expansive at the edges of the stimulus
range and compressive in the middle. When the anchor locations
are replotted as a function of the fraction of the physical stimulus
range (such that 0 and 1 correspond to the smallest and largest
physical line lengths), the anchors from all three set size conditions
essentially lie on a common curve (Fig. 6b). Consequently, nearly
all free parameters in the model could feasibly be replaced by a
parametric function involving a small number of parameters. Fur-
ther, these parameters appear invariant to the number of stimuli in
the training set. Fig. 7 illustrates the resulting cost function for the
N ¼ 30 condition. The costs of error are flattened in the middle of
the stimulus range, and steepest at the two extremes. Future
research will be necessary to determine the extent to which this
same cost function generalizes to other datasets and stimuli
(including nonvisual dimensions).
Nearly all properties of model L3 are constant across the three
conditions of the experiment. The primary factor driving the
change in performance is the fixed limit on the information rate
of the channel. As the entropy of the information source increases,
a capacity-limited channel necessitates that some amount of infor-
mation is lost. Rate–distortion theory describes the optimal perfor-
mance that can be achieved in this circumstance. Human
performance is parsimoniously explained as minimizing the cost
of identification error, according to a particular (and previously
unobserved) cost function, while subject to a constraint on channel
capacity.
Absolute identification has long been argued to be a task where
human performance faces a strong limit on information-theoretic
capacity. If capacity is limited, and if the ability to discretely cate-
gorize stimuli is important in our evolutionary history, then it is
reasonable to suppose that the brain might make efficient use of the
capacity that is available. Efficiency might be defined as reducing the
redundancy of neural signals (Barlow, 1961; Olshausen & Field, 1997),
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Estimated anchor positions from model L3. (a) Anchor positions plotted as a function of the ordinal rank of the stimuli in each condition. (b) The same data, with
anchor position replotted against fraction of the total physical stimulus range.
Fig. 7. Resulting cost function for the N = 30 condition, according to the estimated
anchor locations.
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driving factor in perception. Rate–distortion theory offers a means
of recovering (via inverse decision theory) the implicit cost
function based on empirical performance. The results in this
section have shown that this cost function is highly conserved
across different set size conditions. Future work will be necessary
to determine if this same cost function generalizes across different
stimulus dimensions.
The model presented in this section was developed with the
goal of theoretical and conceptual clarity, at the expense of
explaining all aspects of human performance. Notably, human
absolute identification is characterized by strong sequential
dependencies between responses (Stewart et al., 2005). The cur-
rent model could plausibly be extended to account for these effects
by assuming that the implicit model of the statistics of the stimuli
is biased by recent experience; an approach that has been success-
ful in explaining sequential dependencies in other binary choice
tasks (Jones, Curran, Mozer, & Wilder, 2013). The current frame-
work represents a principled and theory-grounded means of study-
ing how implicit statistical learning interacts with perceptual
identification.5. Rate–distortion theory and perceptual working memory
Visual working memory (VWM) is a highly limited storage sys-
tem used for the temporary maintenance and manipulation of
visual information. But how is it limited? In recent years there
has been extensive and ongoing debate regarding the nature of this
limit.
An early view, advanced most famously by Miller’s ‘‘magic
number” paper (Miller, 1956), suggests that working memory is
limited to maintaining a small number of discrete representations.
Miller’s original limit of seven items has subsequently been revised
downwards to 3–4 items (Cowan, 2000) or chunks (Mathy &
Feldman, 2012). These studies primarily examined memory perfor-
mance for discrete, categorical items such as letters or digits. As
applied to visual working memory, the analogous view posits that
visual working memory consists of a small number of discrete
‘slots’, each of which is capable of maintaining a single visual
object (Luck & Vogel, 1997). The key feature of this basic model
is that an item is either remembered, subject to some fixed percep-
tual noise, or it is not (Luck & Vogel, 2013).
More recently, an alternative view has emerged suggesting that
the fundamental limit in visual working memory is not the number
of discrete slots, but rather a continuous resource (for a recent
review, see Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014). The distinguishing feature
of this model family is that there is a continuum in the fidelity of
memory representations. Items that are encoded with a large
amount of resource will exhibit high-fidelity or high-precision
memory representations, whereas memory items with limited
resource allocation will have poor memory precision or fidelity.
An important question for this model family is the nature of the
continuous resource that is limited. One intuitively plausible
explanation suggests that the gain of neural activity maintaining
memory representations is the limiting resource (Bays, 2014,
2015; van den Berg, Awh, & Ma, 2014).
In this section, a computational level (Marr, 1982) account of
perceptual working memory is developed. Here memory resource
is identified with channel capacity in the formal sense of informa-
tion theory. Notably, this account does not contradict neural or
mechanistic explanations for a limit in channel capacity. Informa-
tion theoretic transmission is closely related to the limits on the
gain in neural populations (Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Rieke,
Warland, de Ruyter van Steveninck, & Bialek, 1999). However, by
adopting a computational-level theory it is possible to study and
define optimal memory performance in the context of a cost func-
tion defined by an external task or environment—a perspective
Fig. 8. Rate–distortion curves for a visual working memory experiment using a 2-
AFC procedure and a probability of error cost function. The two curves correspond
to the two stimulus variance conditions of the experiment.
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mechanisms.
Unlike categorization tasks, perceptual working memory often
requires the maintenance of a continuous-valued signal rather
than a discrete categorical representation. For example, when visu-
ally comparing two apples to determine which is larger, visual
working memory must maintain a metric rather than categorical
representation of size. Despite this difference, the application of
rate–distortion theory follows essentially the same pattern as in
the previous section. Perceptual working memory is defined as a
capacity-limited channel described by a conditional distribution
pðy jxÞ. The goal is for this channel to minimize the expected cost
defined by some function Lðx; yÞ. For a given information source
(for example, a probability distribution over visual features), cost
function, and limit on memory capacity, it is possible to derive
the boundedly rational memory system. This can be used either
as a model of human performance, or as a benchmark to compare
performance against, following in the tradition of ideal observer
analyses (Geisler, 2011).
For some combinations of information source and cost function,
it is possible to analytically derive a rate–distortion curve and cor-
responding optimal channel. One such example is a Gaussian infor-
mation source with a squared error cost function, Lðx; yÞ ¼ ðy xÞ2.
In this case, the optimal channel takes the form of an additive
Gaussian noise channel, with the magnitude of the noise deter-
mined by the constraint on information rate. Details of this case
are given in Appendix A, and a model of visual working memory
based on this approach has previously been described (Sims,
Jacobs, & Knill, 2012). However, the empirical cost function for per-
ceptual memory is largely unknown, and existing data suggests
that it may deviate substantially from a quadratic function (Sims,
2015). Consequently, strong assumptions regarding the parametric
form of the cost function may be unwarranted. In the current sec-
tion, the data from Sims et al. (2012) are re-analyzed in the more
general case where both the distribution of visual stimuli and cost
function are unconstrained.
In particular, Sims et al. (2012) conducted an experiment on
visual working memory for line length. Participants viewed dis-
plays containing 1, 2, 4, or 8 line segments of varying length. After
a brief memory retention interval, a new ‘probe’ stimulus was dis-
played at the location formerly occupied by one of the memory
items. The participant was asked to report whether the new stim-
ulus was shorter or longer than the remembered item (a 2-AFC
procedure). The probe stimulus length was determined according
to xþ D, where x indicates the study line length, and D was ran-
domly chosen from the set {1,0.5,0.25,0.075,+0.075,+0.25,
+0.5,+1} cm. The line lengths were sampled from a log-normal
distribution,
pðxÞ ¼ log Nðl;rÞ ¼ 1
xr
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p exp  ln x lð Þ
2
2r2
 !
ð9Þ
with parameter l ¼ 1:1757. In two conditions the variance of this
distribution was manipulated. In the low variance condition,
rlow ¼ 0:0748 and in the high variance condition rhigh ¼ 0:299.
Complete methodological details can be found in Sims et al. (2012).
In this experiment, participants were instructed to answer each
trial as accurately as possible. If a line length x is mis-remembered
as a different length y, what is the task-defined cost of this error?
The experiment used a fixed set of perturbations, D. If the remem-
bered line length y is less than the probe stimulus, xþ D, then the
probe stimulus will appear longer and the participant should
respond as such. This response would be correct if on that partic-
ular trial D > 0. Following this reasoning, the true cost function
for the task can be written asLðx; y jDÞ ¼
0 if ðy < xþ DÞ ^ ðD > 0Þ;
0 if ðy > xþ DÞ ^ ðD < 0Þ;
1 otherwise:
8><
>: ð10Þ
Lðx; yÞ ¼
X
D
Lðx; y jDÞPðDÞ ð11Þ
Fig. 8 illustrates the optimal rate–distortion curves for this
experiment, computed using the software package described in
Appendix B. This figure demonstrates a strong prediction of the
theory, namely that for an efficient memory system, increasing
the variance of the information source will necessarily lead to a
decrease in performance. This is depicted visually by the fact that
at a fixed information rate (a horizontal line through the graph)
the minimum achievable distortion depends on the variance of
the information source. The rate–distortion curves can also be used
to estimate an assumption-free lower bound on human memory
capacity in each condition of the experiment. However, the tight-
ness of this bound depends on whether the cost function used to
generate the rate–distortion curve matches the goals of the indi-
vidual performing the task.
In Section 4, it was possible to directly estimate the mutual
information between the information source and participants’
responses, and use this to compute information-theoretic effi-
ciency via Eq. (8). This was possible because the experiment used
a small number of discrete stimuli and responses. In the current
case, the stimuli are drawn from a continuous probability distribu-
tion. Estimating Hðx; yÞ in this case would require either an infeasi-
bly larger number of trials or else making strong assumptions
regarding the nature of the conditional distribution pðy jxÞ. How-
ever, it is still possible to use rate–distortion theory to develop effi-
cient models of visual working memory by estimating memory
capacity from the observed level of human performance. If
QH ¼ pðy jxÞ represents an optimal capacity-limited channel, then
for a given stimulus x, the likelihood of the participant responding
that the probe stimulus is larger is given by the probability that
y < xþ D.
For an ideal memory system, the corresponding memory chan-
nel will be optimized for the statistics of the information source as
well as the cost function. It may be the case however that a per-
son’s implicit knowledge of sensory statistics may not match the
true stimulus statistics. It may also be the case that the implicit
cost function deviates from the task-defined cost of memory error
(as in the case of absolute identification). To examine this possibil-
ity, both the cost function as well as the distribution of the stimuli
can be treated as parameters estimated from the data. For the
Fig. 10. Estimated memory capacity from each set size condition is shown by the
black line and marker points. Perfect memory sharing would predict that capacity
should be inversely proportional to the set size, as shown by the dashed line.
190 C.R. Sims / Cognition 152 (2016) 181–198current experiment, a parametric family of cost functions is consid-
ered with the form
Lðx; yÞ ¼ jy xj
b
jy xjb þ ab : ð12Þ
The parameters a and b determine the shape of the cost function.
All curves in this family are monotonically increasing and reach
an asymptote at 1. The parameter a determines the memory error
at which the cost reaches half its maximum, L ¼ 0:5. The parameter
b determines the slope or steepness of the cost function. A similar
family of cost functions was used to model visual working memory
for other features such as color or line orientation (Sims, 2015).
The implicit stimulus distribution is assumed to be a log-normal
distribution with parameters l and r. This is also the distribution
actually used to generate stimuli in the experiment (separate anal-
yses show that a log-normal distribution offers a better model of
the implicit statistics than a Gaussian distribution). By estimating
the parameters l and r rather than assuming the veridical values
it is possible to examine the extent to which visual working mem-
ory adapts to the statistics of the information source, and the
extent to which performance is explainable by a mismatch
between assumed and veridical statistics.
Lastly, different trials of the experiment varied the set size (the
number of stimuli that were presented simultaneously). It is to be
expected that as more items are held in memory, less capacity will
be available to encode or represent each item (Sims, 2015; Sims
et al., 2012). Hence, the constraint on memory capacity is also esti-
mated separately for each set size condition. Capacity is assumed
to be independent of the distribution of stimuli (low versus high
variance condition), and the cost function and statistics of the
information source as assumed to be independent of the set size.
All parameters were fit to the combined data from all participants
via maximum likelihood estimation.
Fig. 9 illustrates the main features of human performance in
this experiment, as well as the resulting model fit (red curves).
Each panel plots the proportion of trials where the subject reported
that the probe item was larger than the corresponding memory
item, for each value of the perturbation magnitude D. Psychometric
curves are plotted separately for each quartile of the stimulus dis-
tribution (shown as the four separate curves in each panel).Fig. 9. Psychometric performance on a visual working memory task examining memory
whether a probe item was larger or smaller than a remembered stimulus. Each column
different source distributions, a low variance (top row) or high variance condition (bot
indicated by smooth red curves. Psychometric curves are plotted for each quartile of the s
of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web versionThe most notable feature is that performance decreases with
increasing set size, indicated by the flattening of the psychometric
curves. However, there are other important properties of the data
that are captured by the model. At a given set size, performance
is worse in the high variance condition of the experiment (compar-
ing top versus bottom rows). In addition, the response for a fixed
value of D is biased by the initial stimulus that was presented.
Unusually short line segments are less likely to be reported as
being longer when probed, and vice versa for the longest line seg-
ments. Lastly, both the effects if the stimulus variance, as well as
the dependence on the remembered stimulus value strongly inter-
act with set size (both effects are largest at high set sizes). All of
these effects are explained by rate–distortion theory without addi-
tional mechanistic assumptions.
Fig. 10 shows the estimated memory capacity per item for each
set size condition of the experiment. Note that this is the estimated
capacity limit for the implicit statistics of the information source,
and not the amount of information conveyed for the true distribu-
tion of stimuli. If a fixed memory capacity were perfectly shared
among all encoded items, estimated memory capacity would be
inversely proportional to the set size, R / 1=N. This prediction is
shown for comparison by the dashed curve in Fig. 10. The match
between the estimated and predicted capacity is reasonably closefor line length, data from Sims et al. (2012). Participants were tasked with detecting
shows memory performance for a different set size. Stimuli were drawn from two
tom row). Empirical data is indicated by plot markers and black lines. Model fit is
timulus range (shown as the four separate curves in each panel). (For interpretation
of this article.)
C.R. Sims / Cognition 152 (2016) 181–198 191but not exact. This suggests that human visual working memory is
reasonably, but not perfectly efficient at dividing available memory
resources among multiple items, a finding that has been replicated
across a large number of datasets (Sims, 2015). The capacity esti-
mates reported here are substantially lower than those previously
reported in Sims et al. (2012). Two factors account for this differ-
ence. One is that the current model does not attempt to account
for sensory noise, but rather folds this into the estimate of memory
capacity. The other factor is that the model reported in Sims et al.
(2012) allowed for variability in the number of items encoded. In
the current model, capacity estimates reflect a mixture of
memory-based responses, and trials where the tested item was
not encoded in memory. Including these latter responses will nec-
essarily bring down total memory capacity estimates. There are
clearly many possible extensions to the model. The current imple-
mentation was chosen to highlight the formal elements of rate–
distortion theory: the statistics of the information source, the cost
function, and the constraint on capacity. However, formal model
comparisons (Sims, 2015) have shown that even this simple model
family offers a superior quantitative account of human memory
performance compared to currently available alternative models.
The empirically estimated cost function from the dataset is
shown in Fig. 11 (red curve), based on the parametric familyFig. 11. Comparison of the task-defined cost function (step-like function) to a
quadratic cost function (blue curve) and the implicit cost function estimated from
human performance (red curve). The estimated cost function is based on the
parametric family described by Eq. (12). (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
(a)
Fig. 12. (a) Error distribution, or the probability distribution of the quantity y x, und
empirical data (blue). (b) Residual, defined as the difference between the error distributio
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of thidescribed by Eq. (12). The estimated cost function is compared to
the task-defined cost function (step-like function, black curve)
from Eq. (11), as well as a simple quadratic cost function (blue
curve) that was previously assumed by (Sims et al., 2012). The
empirical cost of error rises more steeply for small errors compared
to a quadratic function, but saturates for larger errors. This pattern
has also been replicated across a number of datasets (Sims, 2015),
as well as in the case of estimating the implicit cost function for
sensorimotor errors (Körding &Wolpert, 2004). Note however, that
by assumption all of the cost functions considered are stimulus
invariant. That is, they depend on the difference y x, but not on
the particular stimulus value x that is encoded. This assumption
was shown to be inappropriate in the case of absolute identifica-
tion (Fig. 7). Hence it is likely that a more complicated family of
cost functions could improve the accuracy of the model.
Fig. 12a plots the error distribution predicted by the model, that
is the probability distribution for the quantity y x (shown by the
blue shaded distribution). For comparison, the error distribution
predicted by a quadratic cost function is also shown (shaded
red). Note that the information constraint is the same for both
cases, and only the cost function differs. The predicted error distri-
bution exhibits a sharper peak, and heavier tails compared to that
predicted by a quadratic cost function. This difference is high-
lighted in Fig. 12b, which shows the residual, defined as the error
distribution for the estimated cost function, minus the error distri-
bution assuming a quadratic cost function. A highly similar pattern
of residual also remains between the empirical error distribution
and that predicted by a mixture of Gaussian and uniform responses
(Zhang & Luck, 2008). This pattern of residual has also been
observed in other datasets and used as evidence against a slot-
based memory representation (van den Berg, Shin, Chou, George,
& Ma, 2012).
In the current model, and unlike previous analysis of this data-
set (Sims et al., 2012), the possibility was considered that the sub-
jects’ implicit understanding of the stimulus statistics might differ
from the true generative model. Fig. 13 compares the distribution
used to generate the stimuli with the estimated implicit distribu-
tion, for each variance condition of the experiment. The inferred
distributions are substantially broader than the true stimulus dis-
tribution. These differences render human participants strictly
suboptimal at the task: given the same memory capacity, higher
performance could be achieved by adopting an implicit source dis-
tribution that matched the task-defined statistics exactly. This dis-
crepancy may reflect incomplete statistical learning on the part of
the experimental participants. In this case, participants completed(b)
er either a quadratic cost function (red) or the cost function estimated from the
n predicted by the empirical and quadratic cost functions. (For interpretation of the
s article.)
Fig. 13. Comparison of the distribution used to generate stimuli in the low and high variance conditions (blue shaded distributions, left and right panels) to the estimated
implicit distribution used by visual working memory (red shaded distributions). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
Fig. 14. Illustration of dependencies among items encoded in visual working
memory. Stimuli x1 and x2 are drawn independently from a Gaussian distribution.
However, visual working memory assumes a correlation between features. As a
result, the recalled values y reflect a bias towards the across-trial mean of the
stimuli, as well as the within-trial mean of the two stimuli. This is illustrated by the
fact that the channel distributions, pðy1 jx1; x2Þ and pðy2 jx1; x2Þ, indicating the
distribution of recalled values, are shifted towards the mean of the two stimuli x1
and x2.
192 C.R. Sims / Cognition 152 (2016) 181–198only one experimental session in each variance condition. Part of
the nature of perceptual expertise may involve fine tuning implicit
knowledge of the statistics of task-relevant information.
Despite the difference between the true and estimated distribu-
tions, there is evidence that humanmemory performance adapts to
the statistics of the task. The variance of the implicit distribution is
higher in the high-variance condition of the experiment, as would
be expected by an adaptive memory system. The means of the
inferred distributions are somewhat lower than the true distribu-
tion (estimated l ¼ f1:06;0:60g for the low and high variance con-
ditions, true l = 1.18).
Another possibility is that the broader distributions shown in
Fig. 13 may reflect conservatism on the part of visual memory.
Optimizing memory performance for a narrow range of stimuli
would preclude the accurate memory of stimuli that unexpectedly
fall outside of this range. Future research would be necessary to
untangle these possibilities. The most important point illustrated
by Fig. 13 is that human visual memory cannot meaningfully be
separated from the study of implicit statistical learning (Orhan,
Sims, Jacobs, & Knill, 2014).5.1. Inter-item dependencies in visual working memory
In the preceding section, it was assumed that each stimulus
item is encoded independently in visual working memory. The
recalled memory representation is in general biased towards the
mean of the stimulus distribution (with the exact magnitude of
the bias depending on memory capacity and the particular cost
function). However, conditioned on the stimulus distribution, each
memory representation is statistically independent. As a number
of researchers have demonstrated, assuming complete indepen-
dence among memory items neglects empirically-observed depen-
dencies (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Orhan
& Jacobs, 2013). For example, when shown two different stimuli,
memory recall might be biased towards the mean of the two stim-
uli (a perceptual magnet effect). In this section, a toy example is
given to illustrate this effect and show how it can be explained
within the rate–distortion theory framework.
To account for inter-item dependencies, Orhan and Jacobs
(2013) developed the probabilistic clustering theory of visual work-
ing memory. According to this model, visual memory assumes an
incorrect generative model for visual information, according to
which individual stimuli are drawn from clusters (using a nonpara-
metric Bayesian prior over cluster assignments). The consequence
of this assumption is akin to a form of visual chunking. Stimulusitems that are nearby exhibit a magnet effect, such that memory
representations are biased towards the mean of each cluster.
The idea that the brain may adopt an implicit understanding of
visual statistics that differs from the true statistics is not incompat-
ible with the current theoretical framework (as illustrated by
Fig. 13). Indeed, probabilistic clustering theory can be incorporated
in its entirety within rate–distortion theory as an additional
assumption on the implicit prior over visual stimuli. Fig. 14 illus-
trates this approach using a simplified example. In this example,
rather than independently encoding features, a single memory
channel is used to simultaneously encode and recall two features,
x1 and x2. For example, x1 and x2 might correspond to two line seg-
ments of different length presented to the observer to store in
visual working memory.
In the example, these features are generated independently
from a Gaussian distribution with mean = 0 and SD = 3. However,
the memory channel assumes that these features are correlated
(in this example using a correlation coefficient q ¼ 0:5). The cost
function is assumed to minimize the summed squared error for
x1 and x2. Fig. 14 demonstrates that the distribution of recalled val-
ues, y1 and y2 exhibit both a bias towards the prior distribution of
the stimuli, as well as inter-item dependencies (a bias towards the
mean of x1 and x2). The figure demonstrates that visual working
memory is biased towards the mean of the two presented stimuli,
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the midpoint of x1 and x2. Without assumed correlations between
stimuli, the recall distributions would be biased towards the over-
all mean, pðxÞ, but not towards the within-trial mean of x1 and x2.
Note that this example is somewhat exaggerated for the sake of
visualizing the inter-item dependencies. In addition, the simple
assumption of correlated features could be replaced by a more
complicated statistical model such as the clustering theory pro-
posed by Orhan and Jacobs (2013). The only major limitation is
that of computational complexity of determining an optimal infor-
mation channel.5
6. Discussion
What is the place of rate–distortion theory in understanding the
nature and limits on human perception? Clearly the answer
to this question depends on one’s goals. Marr (1982) suggested a
three-level hierarchy for understanding human vision: the imple-
mentation, algorithmic, and computational level. These three
levels represent a successive shift from explanations focused on
the internal (neural architecture) to explanations focused on the
external (the structure of the environment and the high level goals
of the system). The motivation behind the present paper has been
largely to argue on behalf of rate–distortion theory (Berger, 1971;
Shannon, 1959) as a useful and productive theoretical framework
for studying human perception at the computational level.
Rate–distortion theory combines the central elements of both
information theory and decision theory, and is uniquely situated
for explaining biological computation as a principled, but
capacity-limited system. As a computational-level theory, the goal
is not to contradict explanations formulated at the neural or
algorithmic level, but rather provide an explanation for the ‘why’
of behavior, and provide inspiration for the development of
mechanistic theories.
The application of information theory to human perception is
an idea nearly as old as information theory itself (Attneave,
1954; Barlow, 1961; Garner & Hake, 1951; Miller, 1956). How-
ever, rate–distortion theory contributes something qualitatively
different to this area. In particular, a fixed information transmis-
sion limit is not sufficient as an explanation for behavior. If
human perception is to be described as an information channel,
it is also necessary to understand the goal of communication. In
this regard, rate–distortion theory contributes an important per-
spective to the study of human perception. The objective for bio-
logical information processing is not (merely) the communication
of information, but rather the minimization of relevant costs.
Information is simply a means to an end. The incorporation of
costs into the framework of information theory defines rate–
distortion theory.
This framework was applied to two benchmark domains in the
study of human perception: absolute identification (the assign-
ment of perceptual stimuli to ordinal categories) and perceptual
working memory. The study of absolute identification has long
been concerned with apparent capacity limits, without regard for
the goal of information processing. The most intuitive goal—that
of maximizing performance on a typical absolute identification
experiment—offers a poor account of human performance. It is
only by extending information theory to account for the goals of
information processing (as captured by a cost function) that a
quantitatively accurate model of human performance emerges.
The current paper represents the first time the implicit cost function5 In this example, the distribution pðx1; x2Þ is treated as discrete with 100 bins per
feature dimension. As the number of features increases, the size of pðxÞ scales
exponentially. This suggests the utility of developing Monte Carlo techniques that can
be applied to rate–distortion problems (e.g., Jalali & Weissman, 2008).for human absolute identification has been investigated. At the
least, this represents a new means of characterizing human perfor-
mance. However, this result also represents a starting point for a
much broader set of research questions, for example, examining
the extent to which task instructions or extensive practice might
alter the implicit cost function for perceptual identification.
The goal in developing this model was not to propose a highly
detailed model of human absolute identification. In fact there are
important behavioral phenomena that are not explained by the
current model. Human responses show strong sequential depen-
dencies, including assimilation of responses towards recent stimuli
(reviewed in Stewart et al., 2005). Although not explained by the
current model, these findings are not fundamentally incompatible
with rate–distortion theory. Sequential dependencies can arise in
the current framework through stimulus-dependent changes in
either the cost function or assumed statistics of the information
source. Indeed, it is an important element of the framework that
one’s implicit understanding of the statistics of the environment
may not match the ecological statistics. The current approach
allows for quantifying and studying mismatch in statistical learn-
ing in a direct and principled manner.
The second half of the paper examined the use of rate–distor-
tion theory in modeling visual working memory. Much of the his-
tory of research in visual working memory is characterized by
debates between alternative implementation and algorithmic-
level models of performance (reviewed in Luck & Vogel, 2013).
The present goal was the development of a computational-level
exploration of visual working memory performance. The most
important element that accompanies this shift in perspective is
the emphasis on the behavioral or biological costs of memory error,
something that is lost in focusing purely on mechanistic explana-
tions. This approach has been employed previously (Orhan et al.,
2014; Sims, 2015; Sims et al., 2012). What is new in the current
paper is the simultaneous estimation of the implicit cost function
for behavior, as well as the implicit model or understanding of
the statistics of the visual environment. Thus, rate–distortion the-
ory defines three critical components that limit human perceptual
memory: information-theoretic limits on memory capacity, mis-
matches between ecological statistics and implicit statistical learn-
ing (see also Orhan & Jacobs, 2014), and mismatches between task-
defined and implicit cost functions. As demonstrated in the current
paper, each of these components can shed light on the nature of
human visual working memory. Beyond the scope of simple labo-
ratory tasks, these three components can be used as a novel and
principled means of characterizing or understanding the relation-
ship between perceptual memory and perceptual expertise
(Curby, Glazek, & Gauthier, 2009; Herzmann & Curran, 2011). Intu-
itively, perceptual experts such as radiologists or satellite image
analysts should have implicit cost functions that more closely align
with the costs of error in their domain of expertise, as well as sta-
tistical learning that reflects the veridical structure of the environ-
ment. This area repersents a promising direction for future
research.
6.1. Relationship to Bayesian models of perception
The most obvious alternative to the current approach is the
framework of Bayesian inference (Knill & Richards, 1996;
Körding, 2007; Maloney & Mamassian, 2009). However, it would
be misleading to characterize the two approaches as incompatible.
Both Bayesian inference and rate-distortion theory are concerned
with optimal inferences and minimizing cost. The primary differ-
ence lies in the origin of the constraints on performance. Bayesian
models of perception often incorporate two qualitatively different
types of uncertainty. The first is fundamental uncertainty due to
ambiguous information available to the observer. For example,
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from its 2D projection on the retina (Kersten et al., 2004); this
uncertainty is inherently external to the organism. A second type
of uncertainty frequently encountered in Bayesian models of per-
ception is internal noise. For example, one might model the sen-
sory encoding of a stimulus as a Gaussian noise-corrupted
version of the afferent signal (Orhan & Jacobs, 2013; Stocker &
Simoncelli, 2006). In this latter case, the framework of Bayesian
inference is agnostic regarding why signals should be noisy, or
what form that noise should take. In particular, what is ‘rational’
about Gaussian noise (as opposed to some other noise distribu-
tion)? In this regard, rate–distortion theory takes a small, but
important step beyond Bayesian models of perception.
Specifically, rate–distortion theory assumes that physical com-
munication is necessarily capacity-limited, and that the goal of
information transmission is to minimize some particular cost func-
tion. Neither of these assumptions is particularly controversial in
psychology or neuroscience. However, this formulation generates
specific predictions for the nature of encoding noise, rather than
treating noise in an atheoretical manner. For example, it has been
shown that rate–distortion theory offers a parsimonious explana-
tion as to why the empirical error distribution in visual memory
is non-Gaussian (Sims, 2015). By optimizing the channel encoder
to the task, rate–distortion theory is, in one sense, more optimal
than Bayesian models that may make arbitrary assumptions about
the nature of noise (such as the common Gaussian noise assump-
tion) and only perform optimal inference (decoding).6.2. Falsifiability and normative status of the framework
Rate–distortion theory is not a specific model of human percep-
tion, but rather a general theoretical framework in which hypothe-
ses can be formulated and tested. This property is also shared by
the Bayesian approach to understanding perception or cognition.
In recent years, Bayesian models of cognition have been critiqued
in terms of their falsifiability (Bowers & Davis, 2012a, 2012b) due
to the potential for arbitrary choices regarding the prior, likelihood,
and/or utility function specified in a given model. Given their sim-
ilarity, models developed in an information-theoretic framework
are of course also subject to such critiques. However, as has been
pointed out elsewhere (Hahn, 2014), charges of arbitrary assump-
tions may be leveled against anymathematical modeling approach.
Hence, it is more appropriate to talk about the falsifiability of
specific models, rather than of an entire theoretical framework.
Indeed, the central element of rate–distortion theory—that physi-
cal communication channels must possess only finite capacity—is
closer in status to a scientific law than a hypothesis.
In the current paper, rate–distortion theory has been used to
develop two qualitatively different kinds of models of perception.
The first represents a strong prediction for boundedly rational
behavior. In this case, the cost function is fixed by the environment
or the task that is being performed, and the only assumption is that
the individual seeks to maximize task performance subject to a
constraint on channel capacity. Such models are clearly falsifiable,
as demonstrated in the current paper (Fig. 5). In the second class of
models, the goal is not a normative justification for behavior, but
rather a descriptive explanation for behavior at Marr’s computa-
tional level. Models in this category do not seek to test or reject
specific hypotheses regarding the perceptual cost function, but
rather intend to accurately describe or infer the cost function. This
approach is essentially the application of inverse decision theory
(Körding et al., 2004) to human perception. Both classes of models
can exist comfortably within the same theoretical framework.
However, it is essential that the theoretical status for a particular
model is clear.An explanation for behavior must include an understanding of
the goals of the organism, the environment in which it must
behave, and the constraints (both internal and external) that limit
performance. The greatest strength of rate–distortion theory as
applied to human perception is that it enables the specification
of ‘ideal observer’ models of performance (Geisler, 2011) that for-
mally incorporate each of these elements, as well as new tools
for the quantitative analysis and description of perception. While
framed at the computational level, the ultimate goal of this
approach is to constrain and inspire both the algorithmic and
mechanistic understanding of human perception.Acknowledgements
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This section briefly describes four approaches to solving rate–
distortion problems. A rigorous treatment of the first three
approaches can be found in Berger (1971). The final approach
described in this section, based on the Blahut algorithm (Blahut,
1972), is also the favored method due to its simplicity, generality,
and computational efficiency. A software package implementing
this algorithm, written in the R programming language, is made
available. Details on installing and using this package are given
in Appendix B.A.1. Numerical solution via convex optimization
For discrete signals, the fundamental optimization problem can
be restated as follows:
Minimize
X
i
X
j
Qðyj jxiÞPðxiÞ log
Qðyj jxiÞ
QðyjÞ
ðA:1Þ
subject to Qðyj jxiÞP 0 for all xi; yj;X
j
Qðyj jxiÞ ¼ 1 for all xi;
X
i
X
j
Lðxi; yjÞQðyj jxiÞPðxiÞ ¼ D:
This problem corresponds to finding the minimum channel
capacity necessary to achieve a desired level of performance (the
mutual information of the channel is being minimized). Note that
this differs from the statement given in the main text, where the
goal instead was to minimize cost subject to a capacity constraint.
In fact, the current formulation defines a distortion–rate function,
the mathematical inverse of the rate–distortion curve considered
in the main text. The only difference is the exchange of the inde-
pendent and dependent variables. Since rate–distortion functions
are monotonically decreasing, the same curve would result from
minimizing distortion subject to a capacity constraint, as minimiz-
ing capcity subject to a distortion constraint (Berger, 1971).
The first two constraints in Eq. (A.1) arise from the fact that Q
must represent a valid conditional probability distribution. This
problem falls into the general class of convex optimization prob-
lems, since mutual information is a convex function of Q. Hence,
there are many general purpose solution methods available. Read-
ers may consult (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004) for a general intro-
duction to convex optimization.
Fig. A.1. Blahut algorithm (Blahut, 1972) for efficiently computing the rate–
distortion curve and optimal channel for an arbitrary discrete source and cost
function.
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The major difficulty in obtaining an analytical solution to Eq.
(A.1) is the inequality constraint requiring that all probabilities
be non-negative. An alternative solution method is to (temporar-
ily) ignore this constraint, leaving a minimization problem with
only equality constraints. The solution to this modified problem
can then be checked to ensure that all probabilities are non-
negative. To solve this problem, we construct an augmented
function:
JðQÞ ¼ IðQÞ 
X
i
li
X
j
Qðyj jxiÞ  s
X
i
X
j
Lðxi; yjÞQðyj jxiÞPðxiÞ; ðA:2Þ
where li and s are Lagrange multipliers associated with the equality
constraints. This augmented function can be solved by setting its
derivative equal to zero, and solving for Qðyj jxiÞ;li, and s. The result
is a set of j simultaneous equations involving the unknowns qj:
X
i
PðxiÞesLðxi ;yjÞP
k qk esLðxi ;ykÞ
¼ 1 ðA:3Þ
For any chosen value of s (s < 0) the above can be solved (in princi-
ple) for the values qj. If qj > 0 for all j, the optimal channel can be
obtained according to
Qðyj jxiÞ ¼
qj e
sLðxi ;yjÞP
k qk esLðxi ;ykÞ
: ðA:4Þ
The optimal rate–distortion curve can also be computed as a
parametric function of s according to
DðsÞ ¼
X
i
X
j
kiPðxiÞqj esLðxi ;yjÞ Lðxi; yjÞ; ðA:5Þ
RðsÞ ¼ sDþ
X
i
PðxiÞ ln ki;
with ki ¼
X
k
qk e
sLðxi ;ykÞ
 !1
:
The parameter s turns out to be the slope of the rate–distortion
curve at the coordinates ðDðsÞ;RðsÞÞ. Since rate–distortion curves
are monotonically decreasing, the slope of the curve, and hence s
must be negative. Note that the above computes the information
rate in nats. To convert to bits it is necessary to multiply RðsÞ by
log2ðeÞ  1:442695.
Example: We wish to design an optimal, but capacity-limited
channel for communicating the outcome of rolling a six-sided
die. The cost function to be minimized is the probability of error
(also known as the Hamming distance function), as given by Eq.
(6). In this case, PðxiÞ ¼ 1=6 for i 2 1 . . .6. Applying Eq. (A.3) gener-
ates a system of 6 simultaneous equations. This system is most
easily be solved with a computer algebra system such as Mathe-
matica. In the present case, this yields the particularly simple
solution qj ¼ 1=6 for all j. Substituting this result in Eq. (A.5) gives:
DðsÞ ¼ 5e
s
6 16þ 5e
s
6
  ;
RðsÞ ¼ s 5e
s
6 16þ 5e
s
6
 þ log 11
6þ 5e
s
6
 !
:
Solving to eliminate the implicit parameter s results in the solu-
tion given in the main text, Eq. (7).
A.3. Analytical solution for continuous information sources
Rate–distortion theory is not limited to discrete input and out-
put alphabets. The same framework applies to continuous signals,
although unfortunately in many cases no analytical solution can beobtained. The general approach is to follow the pattern for the dis-
crete case. The results already presented in the previous section are
applicable merely by replacing discrete summations with integrals.
One exception however is the interpretation of the entropy of a
continuous random variable, HðxÞ. For such a random variable
described by a probability density function pðxÞ, the differential
entropy is given by
HðxÞ ¼ E  log pðxÞ½  ¼ 
Z 1
1
pðxÞ log pðxÞdx: ðA:6Þ
Importantly, this quantity does not indicate the absolute
amount of information contained in a source, but rather the rela-
tive entropy compared to the coordinate frame (the differential
entropy is zero for a uniform distribution over the unit interval).
This is highlighted by the fact that differential entropy, unlike its
discrete counterpart, can be negative.
With the above caveat, rate–distortion problems can be solved
for continuous information sources by forming the continuous
analog of the Lagrangian in Eq. (A.2), replacing summations by
integrals. The optimal information channel is determined by the
stationary point of this equation. Solving this requires techniques
from the calculus of variations. For an introduction to this topic,
see Sagan (1992). One important result in the continuous domain
is stated in the following example.
Example: Rate–distortion curve for a Gaussian source and
quadratic cost function. If the information source is described by
a Gaussian distribution with mean l and variance r2, and the cost
to be minimized is the quadratic function Lðx; yÞ ¼ ðy xÞ2, then it
is possible to analytically solve for the optimal communication
channel, as well as the optimal rate–distortion curve. A full deriva-
tion is provided in Berger (1971). For this problem, the optimal
communication channel is given by
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  ðA:7Þ
lm ¼ xþ e2Rðl xÞ
r2m ¼ e4Rðe2R  1Þr2
where R is the information rate of the channel, specified in nats. The
corresponding rate–distortion curve is given by
R ¼
1
2 log
r2
D
 	
; 0 6 D 6 r2;
0; DP r2:
8<
: ðA:8Þ
This result captures several properties that are true of human
visual working memory. First, the channel output will be biased
towards the mean of the prior distribution, and the magnitude of
this bias will increase as the information rate decreases. Second,
for a channel with fixed capacity, increasing the variance of the
source (indicated by r2) will result in an increase in recall error
as measured by squared error. Both of these predictions have been
shown to hold for human visual working memory (Sims et al.,
2012).
A.4. Efficient numerical solution for discrete sources via the Blahut
algorithm
In many cases, including problems of practical relevance and
interest, analytical solutions to rate–distortion problems are either
unobtainable or computationally intractable. Fortunately, Blahut
(1972) developed an efficient algorithm for numerically solvingListing 1. Using the Blahut algorithm to find anrate–distortion problems. The algorithm requires discrete informa-
tion sources, but can be applied to continuous signals by first dis-
cretizing the source distribution pðxÞ at a suitable resolution.
The steps of this algorithm are illustrated in Fig. A.1. The input
consists of the parameter s (this corresponds to the slope of the
rate–distortion curve at a particular point), and initial values for
the vector qk. It is sufficient to initialize qk ¼ 1=N where N is the
size of the output alphabet. The algorithm is iterative, and is guar-
anteed to converge to a point on the optimal rate–distortion curve.
The parameter e determines the tolerance for convergence, and in
most cases can be set to 0.001.
It is often the case that the appropriate value for s is not known.
For instance, one may wish to find an optimal channel for a given
source and cost function, such that the information rate does not
exceed a constraint given by the value C. What value of s will yield
a channel with this information rate? One simple means of solving
this problem is to implement an outer-loop optimization: search
for the value of s such that the information rate is as close as pos-
sible to the desired constraint given by C. The result of this outer-
loop optimization is the optimal information channel subject to the
capacity constraint. Since this is a unidimensional optimization
problem it can often be performed efficiently.Appendix B. An R package for rate–distortion theory
This section briefly describes a custom software package
written to accompany this paper. The package is written for theoptimal information rate limited channel.
(a) (b)
Fig. B.2. Demonstration of the R software package for solving rate–distortion problems. This example assumes a Gaussian information source with mean = 0 and SD = 3. The
cost function is the quadratic cost function. (a) Information source pðxÞ, and the conditional probability distribution pðy jxÞ. (b) The rate–distortion curve for this example. The
plot markers show the output of the Blahut algorithm, the smooth curve shows the analytical solution.
Listing 2. Computing and plotting the rate–distortion curve.
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algorithm described in the previous section. In addition, the pack-
age contains a number of helper or convenience routines that sim-
plify the development of models based on rate–distortion theory.
All of the models and examples described in this paper were imple-
mented with the aid of this package. Complete documentation
accompanies the package. The full source code for all of the models
described in this paper can be obtained by contacting the author.
B.1. Installation
Instructions for installing the software package can be found at
http://www.pages.drexel.edu/crs346/code.html. This webpage
also contains additional examples of its usage.
B.2. Usage
As a minimal example, consider a Gaussian information source
with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 3. The goal is to find an
optimally efficient communication channel for conveying samples
from this distribution, subject to a constraint on information rate.The cost function for this example is assumed to be the quadratic
error, Lðx; yÞ ¼ ðy xÞ2. This problem can be solved using the Bla-
hut algorithm by using a discretized version of the information
source. The example code in Listing 1 demonstrates the use of
the R package for accomplishing this, and Fig. B.2a shows the
resulting output.
In addition to computing an optimal information channel for a
given constraint on information rate, it is also possible to plot
the full rate–distortion curve. The example in Listing 2 assumes
the same Gaussian information source and cost function, and com-
pares the rate–distortion curve computed via the Blahut algorithm
to the analytical solution described in Appendix A. The output of
this code is shown in Fig. B.2b.
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